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Article
Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking
Energy Policy Based on a National RPS
JOSHUA P. FERSHEE
In Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, Professor
Lincoln L. Davies provides a comprehensive and compelling argument for
a national renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”). This Commentary
Article reviews Professor Davies’ assumptions and conclusions and places
his RPS analysis in context within the broader energy and environmental
debate.
Beyond expanding renewable energy generation and shifting away
from fossil fuels, RPS legislation is often motivated by additional goals:
addressing climate change, improving national security, and promoting
economic development. This Commentary Article argues that, if these
loftier goals are to be achieved, a better articulation of RPS objectives is
necessary. Furthermore, a national RPS is the proper method for
pursuing, and hopefully achieving, these goals because state-level
impediments limit the possibilities for continued progress under state RPS
programs. Finally, any national RPS will need additional legislative and
regulatory assistance, beyond simply a well-designed RPS, to ensure that a
national RPS fully achieves its objectives. Quite simply, in developing an
effective U.S. energy policy, a national RPS is a great starting point, not
an ending point.
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Moving Power Forward: Creating a Forward-Looking
Energy Policy Based on a National RPS
JOSHUA P. FERSHEE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, Professor
Lincoln L. Davies provides a comprehensive and compelling argument for
a national renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”).1 Power Forward
provides an excellent overview of the key issues and challenges facing a
potential federal-level RPS, followed by a unique and informative analysis
of the variance across state RPSs, and explains many of the pitfalls of
state-by-state regulation. Professor Davies then reviews and analyzes the
various state-level RPS designs, efficacy, and performance. This analysis
is perhaps the most significant addition Power Forward offers to the RPS
discourse.
This Commentary Article considers Professor Davies’ analysis and
largely agrees with both his assumptions and conclusions. There are three
primary areas discussed in Power Forward that will be addressed in this
Article. First, this Article expands upon Professor Davies’ discussion of
RPS objectives and argues that a better articulation of those objectives, as
well as subsequent strategies and tactics, is necessary if a national RPS is
to become an effective reality. Second, it considers impediments to
effective state-level RPSs raised in Power Forward and provides
additional examples of those impediments that further support a shift to a
national RPS. Finally, this Article argues that any national RPS will need
additional legislative and/or regulatory assistance, beyond simply a welldesigned RPS, to ensure that a national RPS fully achieves its objectives.
II. RPSS AS A MEANS TO AN END, OR JUST AN END?
Professor Davies appropriately asks whether “the RPS’s core aim of
promoting renewable energy” is better served under state or federal law.2
When discussing some of the additional justifications for RPSs, he further
explains that such espoused “benefits are largely ancillary to RPSs’ core
objective: promoting a new energy market in renewables to, in turn, spur
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.
1
Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339
(2010).
2
Id. at 1343.
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the transition to a sustainably fueled society.” These points are wellstated, and serve, on one level, as an effective analysis of the RPS. They
do not, however, tell the whole story.
A. Carefully Crafting Objectives, Strategies, and Tactics
Around 500 B.C., Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu explained,
“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without
strategy is the noise before defeat.”4 In military operations, as well as in
business and political arenas, successful operations require a clearly stated
objective (or set of objectives) combined with a strategy (or set of
strategies) designed to achieve that objective. Once the objectives and
strategies are in place, tactics are used to obtain the desired result. As
Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz once explained,
“Tactics is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using
battles to win the war.”5
If the RPS is considered the objective, in and of itself, the question
remains for “non-believers”: why promote renewable energy (and
sustainable fuels) in the first place? It is this question—or rather, the
failure to answer this question—that has been a significant impediment to a
national RPS.
The problem is that with the RPS—or, more specifically, the
renewable energy target percentage of the RPS—as the objective, the
strategy becomes the process of passing the RPS legislation. The tactics
would then be the varying mechanisms of incentivizing and enforcing
compliance with the RPS. Professor Davies suggests, however, that the
objective is not simply reaching, for example, a twenty percent renewable
fuel mix in electric generation. The objectives are loftier than that.6
Professor Davies’ analysis suggests (appropriately) that the objective is
to “spur the transition to a sustainably fueled society.”7 This goal,
however, is much broader than mere creation of an RPS (unless the RPS
mandate were set at or near one hundred percent). The strategy would then
be to “promot[e] a new energy market in renewables.”8 Following this line
of reasoning, the RPS serves as a tactical measure serving that end. That
is, the RPS is one tactical way to achieve the strategic goal of creating a
market in renewable energy, which, in turn, can help transition to
electricity generation fueled by sustainable sources.
3

Id. at 1358.
ROBERT HANDFIELD, SUPPLY MARKET INTELLIGENCE: A MANAGERIAL HANDBOOK FOR
BUILDING SOURCING STRATEGIES 233 (2006) (quoting Sun Tzu).
5
JOHN R. ELTING, SWORDS AROUND A THRONE: NAPOLEON’S GRANDE ARMÉE 529 (1997).
6
Davies, supra note 1, at 1357–59.
7
Id. at 1358.
8
Id.
4
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The point here is not to quibble with Professor Davies’ word choices in
explaining the RPS process. Instead, the idea is to help put his RPS
analysis in context within the broader energy and environmental debate,
which extends beyond renewable energy into some of the other ancillary
issues and goals discussed in Power Forward: climate change, national
security, and economic development. This is important because, at the
state level, it is not at all evident that all RPSs share the goals traditionally
associated with RPS legislation. Professor Davies explains that the earliest
rationale for an RPS was to encourage “‘development of alternate
energy.’”9 The evolution became much broader, encompassing economic,
environmental, and national security concerns.10
It is simply not the case, however, that every state RPS passed because
of a desire to promote renewable energy sources, much less pursue some of
the loftier oft-stated goals. Each state’s RPS is motivated by something
that resonates strongly enough in that state for the RPS to become law.
This different motivation is reflected in the different RPS design structures
so aptly explained by Professor Davies.
Consider, as an example, Maine. Maine passed its first RPS in 199711
with what appeared to be one of the most aggressive requirements ever
considered for an RPS. The initial plan required Maine utilities to
demonstrate that at least thirty percent of all their retail power sold in the
state be derived from renewable sources.12 The definition of “renewable”
power in that initial Maine RPS, however, included existing power
produced by hydroelectric and biomass plants that were already in
operation.13 As it turned out, Maine utilities were able to meet the thirty
percent requirement using generation sources already operating.14 Not a
single new renewable generation facility was needed to meet the
mandate.15
As such, it appears that Maine’s goal in passing this initial RPS was
not to increase use of renewable resources or change the electric generation
fuel mix. Rather, it was apparently a mechanism—a strategy—to
demonstrate that Maine was already deriving a significant portion of its
electricity from renewable sources. A legitimate goal, perhaps, but as
discussed, it is not one that fits within the general understanding of the
rationale behind RPS legislation.

9

Id. (quoting IOWA CODE § 476.41 (2008) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 1358–59.
11
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3210 (Supp. 2009).
12
Id. § 3210(3).
13
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, MAINE RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD SUMMARY 1
(2008), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/clean_energy/maine.pdf.
14
Id. at 8.
15
Id.
10
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In 2007, Maine enacted a second mandatory RPS specifically designed
to develop new renewable resources.16 This second RPS required that
covered electricity suppliers demonstrate that at least one percent of their
total kilowatt-hour sales within the state were procured from “new
renewable capacity resources” in 2008, increasing by one percent each year
until 2017 (and beyond), when ten percent of such sales from renewable
resources would be required.17 The design of Maine’s second RPS thus
implements a new strategy: a mandate to pursue the goal of increasing the
amount of renewable energy generation.
Ultimately, a national RPS would not, and could not, exist on an
island. One way or another, a national RPS would be a part of a national
set of goals and objectives. The success—or lack thereof—of a national
RPS would depend on two key issues: (1) what those goals are; and (2)
how well the RPS is designed to achieve those goals. To ensure success,
those goals must be determined before the RPS is implemented.
Otherwise, success will be a matter of luck.
III. REMOVING IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE STATE RPSS:
INCONSISTENT RULINGS AND MISALIGNED INCENTIVES
REGARDING RENEWABLE ATTRIBUTES
With regard to renewable energy credits (“RECs”), Professor Davies
outlines some of the key issues raised under current state RPS regimes.18
He notes that the differing definitions of what constitutes a renewable
resource and the differences in basic accounting methods from state to
state impact the ability of REC markets to function efficiently.19 Davies is
entirely accurate in this assessment, and it raises an additional
consideration: the differing state-by-state standards and requirements also
lead to different state court interpretations.
Contracts created prior to state RPS legislation provide a particularly
appropriate example. In Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Department of
Public Utility Control, the Connecticut Supreme Court was asked to
determine the proper owner (the utility or the generator) of RECs created
pursuant to an entire output contract.20 The contract was silent as to RECs
because RECs did not exist at the time the contract was entered.21
In 1991, the utility, Connecticut Light and Power Company entered a
contract to purchase “the entire [n]et [e]lectric [o]utput” of the generation

16

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3210(3-A).
Id. § 3210(3-A)(A).
18
Davies, supra note 1, at 1359–64.
19
Id. at 1376–78.
20
Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Dep’t Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 159, 163, 168 (Conn. 2007).
21
Id. at 170.
17
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facility owned by a predecessor entity to Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. The
court determined that the Department of Public Utility Control (“PUC”)
was reasonable in determining that the term “electricity” in the 1991
contract included the renewable attribute of the electricity and thus the
utility purchased the later-resulting RECs as part of the agreement.23
As part of the rationale for this interpretation, the court explained:
[T]he term “unbundling” itself implies that the renewable
attribute of the energy generated by renewable energy
sources is an inherent attribute of the energy, and, therefore,
the creation and state recognition of the certificates did not
result in an entirely new commodity but in the splitting of a
preexisting commodity, i.e., “electricity,” that the utility had
contracted to purchase.24
This is simply inaccurate.
First, RECs are an entirely new
commodity.25 That is, they did not exist before the RPS and were created
at the moment of enactment. As the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) explained: “Indeed, states in creating RECs that
are unbundled and tradeable have recognized this. The very fact that RECs
may be unbundled and may be traded under [s]tate law indicates that the
environmental attributes do not inherently convey pursuant to an avoided
cost contract to the purchasing utility.”26
Second, while “electricity” in the 1991 agreement was required by
federal law to come from renewable sources,27 “electricity” typically
means the electrons coming from a generator (unless it is specifically
defined with some other meaning), whether those electrons come from
wind, biomass, or coal.28
Suppose, for example, a state decided that electricity generated by
wind power created “noise abatement certificates,” which were an
obligation to pay $500 per kilowatt-hour generated from wind. It would be
hard to imagine, at least based on the contract language, that the purchaser
22

Id. at 163, 166.
Id. at 176.
24
Id.
25
See In re Ownership of Renewable Energy Certificates, 913 A.2d 825, 827 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2007) (“At issue [in the case] was ownership of a commodity created in this state for the
electric power industry by the [Board of Public Utilities]: Renewable Energy Certificates (‘RECs’).”);
CAROL SUE TOMBARI, POWER OF THE PEOPLE: AMERICA’S NEW ELECTRICITY CHOICES 172, 174
(2008); cf. David Hurlbut, A Look Behind the Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Case Study, 48
NAT. RESOURCES J. 129, 150 (2008) (“[T]he fact that the power is generated by a renewable resource is
another distinct source of economic value responding to both the RPS and to green-power demand, a
value separate from the electricity’s work value.”).
26
American Ref-Fuel Co., 107 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,016, at p. 61,044 (2004).
27
See Wheelabrator Lisbon, 931 A.2d at 163–66.
28
See Hurlbut, supra note 25, at 150 (“There is no physical distinction between electricity
generated by wind power and electricity generated by a coal plant once the electrons get on the
transmission system.”).
23
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would have agreed to take on that part of the obligation. Nonetheless, it
would be accurate to say that the contract to buy electricity from a wind
farm is a contract to buy wind-based electricity; it does not necessarily
follow that any purchaser of that electricity takes on rights or obligations
related to the source of the power generation unless otherwise specified.
This is not to say that the state could not specify that the purchaser takes on
the obligation to pay when the state creates such new certificates. To the
extent the law is silent, however, the contract should dictate.
Third, FERC had already made clear that contracts such as the 1991
agreement “do not convey RECs to the purchasing utility (absent express
provision in a contract to the contrary).”29 FERC noted that although “a
state may decide that a sale of power at wholesale automatically transfers
ownership of the state-created RECs, that requirement must find its
authority in state law.”30 Thus, state law could provide that RECs in
contracts created prior to enactment of an RPS transferred as part of that
contract, but it is not inherent in the contract itself. In fact, some states
seem to determine that the purchasing utility is the owner of unanticipated
RECs, not the generator.31
In all instances, even if the decision is permissible, this determination
seems to ignore the initial goal of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act (“PURPA”), the federal law under which these contracts were created,
and the subsequent RPS, providing an incentive to develop renewable
energy sources. As such, allowing the utility to take the RECs provides the
utility with an unexpected “windfall,”32 rather than providing that windfall
to the renewable energy generator, the entrepreneur who answered the call.
At a minimum, to the extent the utility was going to reap the benefit of the
windfall, the state PUCs should have ensured that such benefit was passed
along directly to consumers.
Another recent state case provides a different view of how RECs
interact with power purchase contracts. In New Mexico Industrial Energy
Consumers v. New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, the New
Mexico Supreme Court determined that RECs are not “purchased power”
and thus cannot be recovered through a utility’s “automatic adjustment
clause.”33 Instead, costs must be recovered through the traditional rate case
procedure.34
29
American Ref-Fuel Co., 105 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,004, at 61,005 (2003), reh’g denied 107 F.E.R.C. ¶
61,016 (2004).
30
Id.
31
See Wheelabrator Lisbon, 931 A.2d at 174 (reporting that at least nine states have made such a
determination).
32
Id.
33
N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 168 P.3d 105, 116 (N.M.
2007).
34
Id.
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The New Mexico Renewable Energy Act (“REA”) is the state’s RPS
that required that at least five percent of retail energy sold in New Mexico
come from renewable sources as of 2006.35 The 2004 REA provided for a
one percent increase each year up to ten percent by 2011.36 The REA
permits utilities to recover reasonable costs of RPS compliance through the
“rate-making process.”37 The New Mexico Public Utility Act provides that
certain costs may be recovered through an “adjustment clause,”38 which the
New Mexico Supreme Court noted does not require the traditional “notice,
hearing, and approval process” that utilities must normally use to change
rates as part of the ratemaking process.39 Specifically, the automatic
adjustment clause allows the utility to recover “taxes or cost of fuel, gas or
purchased power.”40
The court thus faced two issues: (1) whether costs recovered through
the automatic adjustment clause were being recovered as part of the
ratemaking process; and, if so, (2) whether the RPS compliance costs were
properly recovered through the automatic adjustment clause (as opposed to
traditional, and more arduous, ratemaking procedures). The New Mexico
Public Regulation Commission (“PRC”) initially determined that because
RECs were required as part of the utility’s “energy supply mix,” RECs
were a “purchased power cost” (or at least “closely related to . . . purchased
power”) appropriately included in the automatic adjustment clause.41 After
determining that the automatic adjustment clause is part of the ratemaking
process, the court turned to consider whether the PRC had the authority to
allow recovery of RECs under that automatic adjustment clause.42 The
court determined the PRC did not have that authority.43
The purpose of the automatic adjustment clause is to “flow through” to
electricity consumers the increases or decreases in costs of “delivered
energy.”44 The court determined that RECs are not “delivered” energy
because the energy generated that created the RECs was not also purchased
Although the court
and delivered to the utility’s customers.45
acknowledged that recovery under the automatic adjustment clause would
be the “most efficient and cost-effective method” for recovering costs, it
nonetheless found that state law simply did not allow it.46
35

Id. at 108 (quoting N.M. STAT. § 62-16-4(A)(1) (2004)).
Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. § 62-16-4(A)(2)).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-16-6(A) (2010).
38
Id. § 62-8-7(E).
39
N.M. Indus., 168 P.3d at 108.
40
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-8-7(E).
41
N.M. Indus., 168 P.3d at 109–10.
42
Id. at 111.
43
Id. at 116.
44
Id. at 114 (quoting N.M. PUB. REGULATION COMM’N R. 17.9.550.6 (2001)).
45
Id. (emphasis omitted).
46
Id. at 116.
36
37
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Again, the court’s analysis is reasonable, although by no means the
only possible outcome. In fact, because of the RPS mandate, it could
reasonably be argued that purchased RECs (at least up to the state
mandated percentage) are a cost of “delivered energy.” That is, RECs
represent an increase in the cost of delivered energy because the law
requires RECs as part of the delivery process. RECs, in essence, convert
the utility’s purchased power (or a portion thereof) into energy that meets
the RPS requirement. Because state law requires that a certain percentage
of purchased power be renewable, it is a fair argument that RECs are a cost
of purchased power.
When read together, Wheelabrator Lisbon and New Mexico Industrial
provide what appears to be a conflicting outcome. Even though the laws in
each case were significantly different, placing these determinations side by
side makes clear the complex and confusing nature of current RPS
programs. In Wheelabrator Lisbon, Connecticut essentially determined
that RECs are, by definition, “electricity.”47 New Mexico determined in
New Mexico Industrial that RECs are not, by definition, “purchased
power.”48 If nothing else, these cases indicate why sometimes the general
public views lawyers’ arguments as “just words.”49
In the end, and consistent with Professor Davies’ argument,50 these
cases underscore two primary issues.
First, state-by-state RPS
interpretations can create confusion, thus limiting the effectiveness of the
RECs marketplace. Inconsistent decisions such as these can also extend
that confusion to the general public, negatively impacting public
perception of RPSs generally. Second, state RPSs can provide a roadmap
for avoiding some significant pitfalls and problems if a federal RPS were
enacted. Thus, a federal RPS provides great promise because it would
have the opportunity to improve the efficiency of the renewable energy
market by implanting consistent rules created with knowledge of the
lessons learned at the state level.
IV. A HELPING HAND: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL LEGISLATION IS NEEDED
TO SUPPORT A NATIONAL RPS
As discussed above, a national RPS is necessarily part of a larger set of
policy goals and objectives. A national RPS fits in with other energy and
environmental policies, and other such policies fit (or can fit) in with a
national RPS. In fact, not only does a national RPS fit with other policies,
but a national RPS will also require other policies if it is to be successful.
47

Wheelabrator Lisbon, Inc. v. Dep’t Pub. Util. Control, 931 A.2d 159, 176 (Conn. 2007).
N.M. Indus., 168 P.3d at 116.
STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 7–8 (2004).
50
See Davies, supra note 1, at 1364 (“[E]ven if utilities were not increasingly spanning
geographical boundaries, the risk of conflicting RPSs would still be problematic.”).
48
49
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A national RPS will face a number of hurdles, two of which are
especially critical. First, a national RPS will require a significant
investment in infrastructure, especially in terms of generation to
transmission infrastructure. Second, a national RPS, at least to the extent
an initial RPS is not the end game, will require assistance if renewable
fuels are to overcome, and not reinforce, the entrenchment of other fuel
sources—particularly, coal. As this Part discusses, additional federal
legislation can provide a national RPS the assistance needed to address and
overcome both of these issues.
A. Lack of Infrastructure Limits RPSs’ Potential
A successful RPS, state or federal, will require a significant investment
in supporting infrastructure.51 This, of course, includes new and expanded
renewable generation facilities, but also includes major needs in terms of
transmission infrastructure.52 This need has long been recognized, but
recent measures designed to increase infrastructure investment have been
modest at best.53
1. State and Regional Limits: The Frontier Line Example
At the state and regional level, there have been several attempts to
increase transmission infrastructure, but there has been little success. A
good example is the proposed Frontier Line, a project that officially began
in April 2005 with a Memorandum of Understanding Among the
Governors of California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming Concerning Electric
Transmission Development (“Frontier Line MOU”).54 The proposed
Frontier Line is a 1300-mile transmission line that would run from
Wyoming, through Utah and Nevada, to California.55 The project was
designed “to leverage . . . up to 6000 megawatts of wind power and 6000
megawatts of clean coal power.”56 The project was initially estimated to
cost between $3.3 and $5 billion, with between $926 million and $1.7
51
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
IMPLEMENTING BOTH A 25-PERCENT RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD AND A 25-PERCENT
RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD BY 2025, at 5 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/
servicerpt/eeim/index.html.
52
Id.
53
See, e.g., Gregory Reed et al., The FACTS on Resolving Transmission Gridlock, in J. DUNCAN
GLOVER ET AL., POWER SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 228, 228–29 (4th ed. 2008) (“[E]lectricity
stakeholders must find solutions to the vexing problems of rapidly increasing demand, inadequate
infrastructure, and the critical challenge of balancing energy growth with environmental protection.”).
54
Calif. Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger et al., Memorandum of Understanding Among the
Governors of California, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming (Apr. 2005), available at http://psc.state.wy.us/
htdocs/subregional/Frontier%20Liine%20MOU%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
55
Western Governors Back Four-State, $3.3B Line To Bring Energy to West Coast Load Centers,
ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., Apr. 11, 2005, at 16.
56
THE FRONTIER LINE: A TRANSMISSION PROJECT FOR THE AMERICAN WEST 2 (2005), available
at http://psc.state.wy.us/htdocs/subregional/Frontierline040105.pdf.
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billion estimated in annual regional benefits.
If completed, western
electricity consumers were expected to reap a net benefit relatively
quickly.58
Since the Frontier Line MOU was signed in 2005, the need for
additional transmission infrastructure related to renewable energy in the
project states has only increased. California, for example, increased its
RPS requirement to thirty-three percent through Executive Order S-21-09,
which also expanded the RPS to apply to all utilities, including publicly
owned municipal utilities.59 In addition, in 2006, California enacted
Assembly Bill 32, which required the California Air Resources Board to
regulate greenhouse gas sources as part of the state’s plan to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020,60 with a goal of total
reduction of eighty percent of 1990 levels by 2050.61
Nevada, in 2009, increased its RPS requirement (originally passed in
1997)62 to twenty-five percent by 2025.63 In 2008, Utah passed the
Municipal Electric Utility Carbon Emission Reduction Act.64 Although
similar to an RPS, the Act lacks the mandate language found in a true RPS
(i.e., compliance is only required to the extent it is “cost-effective”65) and
is thus really a renewable portfolio goal.66 Nonetheless, this effort still
evidences a greater interest and commitment to renewable energy than
existed in 2005. Wyoming still does not have an RPS or renewable energy
goal,67 but is the source state of much of the renewable energy the Frontier
Line was designed to provide.68
Despite increased interest and commitment to renewable energy
projects and a well-recognized need for additional transmission
infrastructure, the Frontier Line has not progressed. The California
57

Id.
Id.
Cal. Exec. Order No. S-21-09 (2009), available at http://gov.ca.gov/executive-order/13269/.
60
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38,501(e), 38,560 (West 2009); Cal. Exec. Order No. S-2109, supra note 59.
61
Cal. Exec. Order No. S-21-09, supra note 59.
62
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 704.7801–704.7828 (2007).
63
Nev. S.B. 358 (approved by Governor May 28, 2009), available at http://leg.state.nv.us/
75th2009/Bills/SB/SB358_EN.pdf.
64
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-19-101 to 10-19-302 (2010).
65
Id. § 10-19-201(1)(a).
66
See DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Utah:
Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?
Incentive_Code=UT13R&re=1&ee=1 (last visited June 17, 2010) (“While this law contains some
provisions similar to those found in renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) adopted by other states,
certain other provisions . . . indicate that this law is more accurately described as a renewable portfolio
goal (RPG).”).
67
See DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Renewable Portfolio
Standards (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_Map.ppt
(providing a map of states with and without RPS programs).
68
See As Utilities Race To Meet RPS with New Wind Projects, Key Grid Expansion Sets Slower
Pace, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June 11, 2007, at 1.
58
59
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Independent System Operator (“California ISO”) reported in 2008, “A
recent check of the Frontier Line transmission project website shows no
activity on this project since May 2007.”69 An even more recent check
indicates that the Frontier Line project website no longer exists.70
It is not obvious why the once-promising project appears to have
failed. The California ISO opines, “A potential issue is the resource
assumption for the project, since California is requiring that all imports
match the emissions levels of combined-cycle natural gas-fired power
plants.”71 It is also possible that the recent credit crisis and lack of statelevel funding have made financing the project impossible. Perhaps the
states, or some of the states, lost the interest (or the political will) to pursue
the project. Regardless of the reason, a major transmission infrastructure
project needed to increase access to renewable electric generation in the
western United States has stalled.
2. Federal Program Failures: National Transmission Corridors
The regional approach to siting transmission lines, such as the
proposed Frontier Line, is needed because there is limited (at best) federal
authority for siting transmission infrastructure. Although FERC has
jurisdiction over all wholesale (non-retail or “end-use”) electric
transmission transactions and operations,72 FERC does not have
jurisdiction for the siting and construction of transmission lines except in
limited circumstances. In 2006, FERC obtained limited “backstop
authority” through the Energy Policy Act of 2005.73
This “backstop authority” is a limited grant of power available only in
circumstances where the states lack the authority to authorize construction
or otherwise have failed to act.74 Furthermore, backstop authority is
limited to areas the Department of Energy (“DOE”) identifies as a
“national interest electric transmission corridor” (“NIETC”).75 DOE filed
its August 2006 National Electric Transmission Congestion Study,
designating two NIETCs: the Mid-Atlantic Area National Interest Electric
Transmission Corridor and the Southwest Area National Interest Electric
Transmission (covering southern portions of California, Arizona, and

69
CAL. ISO, REPORT ON PRELIMINARY RENEWABLE TRANSMISSION PLANS 48 (2008), available
at http://www.caiso.com/2007/2007d75567610.pdf.
70
A May 19, 2010, search of the site listed in the California ISO report, http://www.frontierline.
org/, generated the message, “Server not found.”
71
CAL. ISO, supra note 69, at 48.
72
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2006); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17 (2002) (“[FERC’s]
jurisdiction includes ‘the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce’ and ‘the sale of
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.’” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)).
73
See 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006).
74
Id.
75
Id.
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76

Nevada). In most circumstances, absent a legislative change, each state
in which the transmission lines would be built retains siting and
construction jurisdiction.77
Even though it has been five years since the Energy Policy Act of 2005
provided FERC with backstop transmission siting authority, zero projects
have commenced under this authority. Some commentators were skeptical
of the power provided under this authority at the outset,78 but there was
still some hope for success.79
Unfortunately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
significantly constrained FERC’s ability to exercise this authority.80 Under
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, FERC is permitted to “issue one or more
permits for the construction or modification of electric transmission
facilities in a national interest electric transmission corridor” if it is
determined that (among other options):
(C) a State commission or other entity that has authority to
approve the siting of the facilities has—
(i) withheld approval for more than 1 year after the filing
of an application seeking approval pursuant to applicable
law or 1 year after the designation of the relevant
national interest electric transmission corridor, whichever
is later; or
(ii) conditioned its approval in such a manner that the
proposed construction or modification will not
significantly reduce transmission congestion in interstate
commerce or is not economically feasible . . . .81

76

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability; Draft National Interest Electric
Transmission Corridor Designations, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,838 (May 7, 2007); see also National Electric
Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992 (Oct. 5, 2007).
77
Cf. Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Power Markets: Re-Imagining
the Role of Courts in Resolving Federal-State Siting Impasses, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 315,
315–16 (2005) (“Ultimately, FERC may need authority to preempt state siting laws, but absent
congressional action, courts might empower state and local siting boards to take into account federal
goals in competitive markets in making siting decisions.”).
78
See, e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and
Market Initiatives Are Insufficient To Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
327, 332, 360 (2007) (stating that the backstop-authority siting process “is protracted and inefficient”
and “similar past initiatives have failed to produce significant results”).
79
See Steven J. Eagle, Securing a Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 46 (2005) (acknowledging the limitations of the federal backstop
siting authority but stating that the Energy Policy Act of 2005 still had the potential to encourage new
transmission investment and help “stave off a catastrophic electric transmission shortage”).
80
See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
Congress gave FERC authority to act only when the state cannot act, fails to act in a timely manner, or
acts inappropriately by granting a permit with unattainable conditions).
81
16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1) (2006).
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FERC had concluded that the phrase in part (C)(i) above, “withheld
approval for more than 1 year,” included a state’s denial of a permit, not
just a state’s failure to act.82 The Fourth Circuit determined, “The
continuous act of withholding approval does not include the final
administrative act of denying a permit.”83 As such, FERC’s backstop
authority cannot be used to overrule a state’s outright denial of a permit;
the authority is only available where the state refuses to act at all or acts
“inappropriately by granting a permit with project-killing conditions.”84
The court considered, then rejected, FERC’s argument that “Congress
would not ‘intentionally allow federal intervention in the event of onerous
state approvals that scuttle projects in national corridors, and yet
intentionally bar federal review where the state outright denies the
application, achieving the same result.’”85 The court determined that there
was a “crucial difference” between the two scenarios:
When a state commission grants approval with project-killing
conditions, it misuses its authority, and the state licensing
system has failed. On the other hand, when a state
commission denies an application outright, it acts with
transparency and engages in a legitimate use of its traditional
powers. There is thus no logical inconsistency between
authorizing FERC to assume jurisdiction in the case of
permit approvals with overburdensome conditions but not in
the case of outright denials.86
Of course, it is not clear why “transparency” in denying a permit
therefore makes that denial legitimate. It seems readily apparent that a
state commission could “misuse its authority” in denying a permit in the
same way it might in issuing a permit with “overburdensome conditions.”
The language Congress used in this provision was, at a minimum, inartful,
because it is open to (and, in fact, compels) interpretation. Because
Congress granted FERC authority to facilitate necessary transmission
projects where the current regulatory regime failed to ensure such
transmission was built,87 however, the proper interpretation of the language
would have been the broader interpretation, as advocated by FERC.88
82
Regulations for Filing Applications for Permits to Site Interstate Electric Transmission
Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,440, 69,444 (Dec. 1, 2006).
83
Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 315.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 314.
86
Id. at 314–15.
87
See 153 CONG. REC. H6782 (daily ed. June 20, 2007) (statement of Rep. Gene Green (D-Tex.)).
Rep. Green indicated:
[T]he Energy Policy Act of 2005, EPACT, allowed for the designation of national
interest corridors where congestion in the electricity grid is jeopardizing reliable
service and raising the cost to electricity consumers. . . . FERC is authorized to get
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3. Repeal of PUHCA: When Mergers Do Not Lead to (Transmission)
Acquisitions
Professor Davies explains that, in light of the Energy Policy Act of
2005 provisions effectively repealing the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act (“PUHCA”),89 the “trend of multi-state utilities is only likely
to increase.”90 For seventy years, PUHCA had, among other things,
limited utility mergers to those that were geographically contiguous,91 thus
significantly limiting utility mergers in general.92 Without those limits,
Professor Davies correctly notes that “utilities operating in more than one
state may well increase—and face the prospect of needing to comply with
multiple RPSs, a task both costly and inefficient.”93
It is also worth noting, however, that this is not likely to be much of a
problem. PUHCA was repealed, at least in part, to help facilitate
infrastructure investment by allowing a broader group of potential
investors to enter the market.94 The idea was that these investors would
bring with them their interest and ability, along with the additional capital,
to make infrastructure investments that had been lacking in recent years.95
This hope has not been achieved.
Although there was initial interest in a number of mergers following
PUHCA’s repeal, many (and perhaps most) have not occurred. This is in
part because of greater merger scrutiny at the state level, an opportunity
expanded in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. As such, the desired (if not
expected) level of mergers has been modest, and the potential additional
investment funds available for expanded transmission infrastructure have
not followed.
More than anything, PUHCA’s repeal provides a cautionary tale with
regard to energy policy. The repeal was hotly contested and costly in
terms of time and effort spent, and yielded little, if any, result. As a
mechanism to induce investment, the repeal has been largely ineffective.
As a mechanism to reduce regulation, this appears to be true, as well.
Energy investment, especially renewable energy investment, is expensive
involved only if the State is unwilling to or cannot act, then only after exhaustive
Federal considerations.
Id.

88
See Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 313–14 (discussing FERC’s interpretation that
withholding approval includes denial of an application within one year).
89
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1261–63, 119 Stat. 594, 972–74 (2005).
90
Davies, supra note 1, at 1363.
91
See 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1) (2000) (repealed 2005); see also N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686,
704 (1946) (stating that PUHCA requires utility holding companies to “integrate and coordinate their
systems” and “divest themselves . . . of geographically and economically unrelated properties”).
92
See Fershee, supra note 78, at 335–36.
93
Davies, supra note 1, at 1363.
94
See Fershee, supra note 78, at 337–38.
95
See Markian M.W. Melnyk & William S. Lamb, PUHCA’s Gone: What Is Next for Holding
Companies?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1–2 (2006).
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and moves slowly. Mild nudges are not likely to have any discernable
effect.
B. Beyond the RPS: Using the Environmental Law and Energy Law
Overlap To Avoid Entrenchment of Fossil Fuels
Professor Davies explains that a national “RPS moves energy and
environmental law closer together.”96 He notes that these two areas of the
law have a tendency to operate along separate paths, despite their obvious
and inherent overlap.97 He then notes that both energy and environmental
law have been moving toward market-based approaches to regulation:
market-based rates on the energy law side and cap-and-trade measures on
the environmental side.98
Given the scope of his article, Professor Davies appropriately focuses
his analysis on this overlap in the RPS context.99 There is, however, an
additional risk, and an additional opportunity, raised by these two
“intrinsically intertwined” areas of the law that warrants comment.100 On
its own, a federal RPS, especially one with renewable goals set too low
(i.e., one that does not appreciably affect the status quo), runs the risk of
entrenching other fuel sources (most obviously, coal).101 With less than
three percent of the current U.S. electricity supply coming from renewable
energy sources,102 a fifteen or twenty percent goal seems far off (and even
overly aggressive) to some.103 If the national RPS works, however, these
goals will be achieved in the relatively near future.
Once the fuel source mix reaches, for instance, twenty percent from
renewable sources, it is possible that technology will have advanced to the
point that an RPS is unnecessary. That appears to be the hope of many
policy makers. This is a nice goal, but prior long-range planning mistakes
suggest that such assumptions are inappropriate and potentially costly.104
96

Davies, supra note 1, at 1393.
Id. at 1391–92.
98
Id. at 1392–93.
99
Id. at 1393.
100
Id. at 1392.
101
Cf. Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL.
L. 931, 945 (2009) (proposing a “new regulatory compact” because the traditional ratemaking process
“entrenched dirty energy”).
102
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Clean Energy at Trinity Structural
Towers Manufacturing Plant (Apr. 22, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_
office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Newton-IA/.
103
See Senate Compromises on Energy Bill After Filibuster of Tax Package and Renewable
Portfolio Standard, FOSTER NAT. GAS REP., Dec. 14, 2007, at 1 (“While a renewable portfolio standard
might sound like a wise idea in principle, it’s going to be almost impossible in reality to meet . . . .”
(quoting Rep. Joe Barton (R-Tex.))).
104
See, e.g., STEVEN MARK COHN, TOO CHEAP TO METER: AN ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE NUCLEAR DREAM 107 (1997) (discussing Atomic Energy Commission Chairman
Lewis Strauss’s 1954 efforts to get science journalists to promote nuclear power, in part by “suggesting
the possibility of ‘electricity too cheap to meter’”).
97
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If technology does not change significantly, by the time the twenty percent
RPS goal is met, it is highly likely that traditional (i.e., fossil) fuel sources
making up the other fifty to sixty percent of the electric generation105 could
be even more entrenched than they are today.
The reason: as the use of renewable sources increases, the demand for
traditional fossil fuel, primarily coal and natural gas, will almost certainly
drop.106 As the price for these sources drops, the appeal of “cheap energy”
from these sources will increase. Without additional and concomitant
measures, an RPS may win the battle, but not the war.
As such, an effective national RPS warrants additional support from
the environmental law arena. To assist the long-term goals of a national
RPS, a price on carbon is essential,107 most likely through a cap-and-trade
program or mandated carbon permits.108 Although many of the RPS
proposals also included cap-and-trade programs, a frequent criticism has
been that such programs are redundant.109 This is not accurate.110
Just as energy law and environmental law overlap, so too would a
national RPS and a national cap-and-trade program. A national RPS would
reduce emissions to some degree, and a national cap-and-trade program
105
This number assumes a fuel mix of twenty percent from renewables, twenty to thirty percent
from nuclear, and the remainder from fossil fuels. Even if nuclear power makes a strong comeback, it
is hard to imagine that enough nuclear generation would be online at that point to amount to more than
an additional ten percent of the national power supply.
106
See Press Release, Woods MacKenzie, Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard Will Reduce
Power and Natural Gas Costs, But Not Have a Significant Impact on GHG Emission Levels (May
2007), available at http://publicutilities.utah.gov/archive/federalrenewableenergyportfoliostandard.pdf
(reporting the results of a study that determined a fifteen percent RPS would cause lower consumption,
and thus lower cost, of fossil fuels, but have little impact on carbon emissions).
107
See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Micro-Offsets and Macro-Transformation: An
Inconvenient View of Climate Change Justice, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 334 (2009). Setting a
price on carbon will require a creative approach:
The more transformative approach [to addressing climate change] will require a
level of law and policy innovation comparable to the one that occurred two decades
ago, launching the current focus on cap-and-trade and carbon tax solutions. It may
be that a single concept comparable to increasing the price of carbon will emerge to
meet this need.
Id. (footnote omitted). For further discussion on the pricing of carbon appearing in this Commentary
Issue, see Jim Rossi, The Limits of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1425,
1443–46 (2010).
108
This is, at its core, a carbon tax. Permits, however, seem more palatable than taxes these days.
109
See Statement Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Energy and Air
Quality, at 3 (Apr. 23, 2009) (statement of James Y. Kerr, II, Counsel, Electric Reliability Coordinating
Council), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090423/testimony_kerr.pdf
(“The market-based least-cost objective of the [recently proposed] cap-and-trade program is thereby
undermined by the [also proposed RPS], and for no additional policy benefits.”).
110
See Marilyn Brown, Foreword to CHRISTOPHER COOPER & BENJAMIN SOVACOOL, RENEWING
AMERICA: THE CASE FOR FEDERAL LEADERSHIP ON A NATIONAL RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD
(RPS) 3, 3 (2007), available at http://www.newenergychoices.org/dev/uploads/RPS%20Report_
Cooper_Sovacool_FINAL_HILL.pdf (stating that the National Commission on Energy Policy
concluded a cap-and-trade program combined with an RPS and increased fuel economy standards “will
produce significantly larger environmental benefits over the next two decades while still meeting the
economic test of ‘no significant harm’”).
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could encourage the use of renewable energy sources. The national RPS,
however, serves to encourage development of generation from a particular
type of source, while the cap-and-trade program would require payment for
consumption of certain other sources and encourage use of a broader set of
sources (e.g., nuclear power). Therefore, if the current iterations of a
national RPS are intended as starting points, not ending points, additional
(and more direct) carbon reduction legislation is also needed if a national
RPS is to achieve its broader energy and environmental policy goals.
V. CONCLUSION
As Professor Davies makes clear, the case for a national RPS
significantly outweighs the case for the status quo. A national RPS could
help encourage necessary investment in new energy infrastructure,
facilitate a national market for RECs, and minimize or eliminate problems
created by inconsistent state rulings. Beyond that, a federal system could
take what is learned from state-level mistakes and conflicts and incorporate
that knowledge into a national RPS. In this way, the United States would
take the best an RPS has to offer, while minimizing any difficulties.
When (hopefully) developing and implementing a national RPS, there
must be a focus on programs to facilitate broader energy policy goals, such
as reducing environmental harm, creating jobs, improving national
security, and, yes, addressing climate change. Not everything needs to
happen at once, and given the broad scope of state-level RPSs, a national
RPS is a logical place to start. A national RPS, however, will need help
from other energy legislation—such as federal siting authority for
transmission lines and a price on carbon—if the largest goals of the RPS
are to be achieved. Quite simply, a national RPS is a great starting point,
not an ending point, if the country is to Power Forward.

